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RIGHTS. OF THE PERSON. By Bernard Schwartz. New York:
Macmillan. 1968. Pp. xi, 1018 (2 vols.) $25.

The publication of Rights of the Person marks the completion
of Professor Bernard Schwartz's magnum opus, his commentary on
the Constitution of the United States.1 Appropriately enough, these
final two volumes focus upon the most recent preoccupations in
constitutional law.
Rights of the Person canvasses the hotly contested battlegrounds
of constitutional adjudication in our generation: the controversies
concerning the position of radical politics in a nation fearful of its
security, the meaning of equality for a long-suppressed racial minority, the role of the police and the uses of the criminal process,
the position of religion in education and in public life, and the
essential institutions of politics itself. Merely to list these issues suggests the difficulty of presenting them meaningfully within the confines of a comprehensive survey. Within the past two clecades each of
them has become a recognized specialty of scholarship, pu::sessing its
own vast literature of historical research, logic-chopping casuistry,
contentious propaganda, behavioral impact studies, philosophical
punditry about the merits or about the judicial role, and so fortha torrent of learning in which even the specialist can only hope to
paddle his own canoe without capsizing in the rapids. Surely no legal
institution has ever been the subject of such continuous observation,
analysis, and comment as the United States Supreme Court and its
constitutional jurisprudence.
Thus, it is understandable that one picks up an all-embracing
review of the Constitution with skeptical curiosity. The appearance
of these latest volumes was peculiarly timely in 1968-a year that
signaled a major shift in the nation's political mood, marked by the
impending end of the "Warren Court" and a revolt against its works
in a historical fight over the successor to the Chief Justice. The time
1. A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. Part I appeared in
two volumes in 1963, under the title THE POWERS OF GoVERNMENT, Part II in one
volume, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY, in 1965.
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may well be ripe for stock-taking, for consolidating some theoretical
positions, whether or not the changing of the guard brings a slowing
or reversal of the flow of innovation. Still, a general commentary on
constitutional "rights of the person" seems at first blush an impossible
undertaking. The issues at stake are as ancient as the earliest articulated concerns of civilization, and more universal than the membership of the United Nations. They are timeless themes of philosophy
and literature, and they are the daily grist of politics and litigation.
An exposition of these issues under our Constitution can be presented as a study in historical evolution, as the ultimate challenge to
the contest of reason this country uniquely entrusts to la,;vyers, or as a
grand procession of classic dilemmas-the antinomy which Cardozo
stated rather than resolved in his phrase about "ordered liberty." To
understand the scope of any guarantee stated in the Constitution, we
want to examine its historical origins, the verbal choices its text offers
to exegesis, the rhetoric of claims and counterclaims in which it appears, and the social context in which these claims once had, now
have, or may someday have validity. To do one of these things well
practically excludes doing the others within any reasonable compass,
as anyone who teaches constitutional law has learned to his frustration. To undertake a synthesis of these diverse approaches and to
apply it to the Constitution as a whole is an impressive ambition.
Fortunately, Professor Schwartz did not let himself be deterred
by the false choices of whether to write another history of constitutional adjudications in the Supreme Court, or a philosophical disquisition on human rights, or an annotated encyclopedia of leading
cases. These volumes repeat none of these particular forms. Rather,
they borrow from each; none is missing entirely, but none is wholly
dominant. In less capable hands, so eclectic an approach might produce a disaster of uncritical generalities and superficial popularization. This author's erudition maintains a notable depth of scholarship for the breadth of the topics covered. His books represent a
highly personal combination of ingredients. They are a commentary,
as they purport to be, but they are also a solidly professional work.
Of course, any choice of ingredients put into the combination
creates problems. Commendably, Rights of the Person is a commentary on the Constitution, not on the Supreme Court. Too often
legal scholarship forgets the difference, or assumes that the Constitution is only what the Supreme Court says it is. Professor Schwartz
does not enter at length into the learned debates of the Court
watchers that stir the academic world. Nevertheless, these books do
not, nor could they, often venture beyond the Constitution as law
to consider it in action outside courts; for instance, these volumes
do not deal with the Constitution as a factor in legislative debate
and executive messages, or as a still powerful appeal in public
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rhetoric, or as the ultimate touchstone of ideological legitimacy in
America. Rights of the Person remains a commentary on constitutional law, though free of the technical constraints of a legal treatise.
Thus, the author illuminates his exposition with frequent judicial
quotations without strict concern for the immediate use of the quoted
statement in a majority opinion, dissent, or extra-judicial essay, or for
its place in an on-going contest of ideas with a competing philosophy.
And in finding illustrative examples in cases from many courts, he
risks misleading the unwary or nonprofessional reader about the
relative weights of citations. In particular, the decisions of state
courts on federal constitutional rights, although indisputably a part
of our constitutional. reality, are still a most unreliable guide to
authoritative constitutional law. In a book that undertakes to combine extensive description, accurate exposition, and independent
evaluation, these divergent uses of the sources must be kept clear in
the reader's mind.
Of course, many pages of exposition also can present only familiar
material, without containing any surprising information or novel
insights for anyone who is acquainted with constitutional law. That
is an unavoidable cost of comprehensiveness; one who undertakes
to be encyclopedic cannot be expected to be continuously profound.
What of the substance of Professor Schwartz's Constitution?
Much is implicit in the very title of these two volumes. Rights of the
Person avoids the risk of becoming a mere annotation of the separate
clauses as they appear in the Constitution in favor of grouping the
constitutional safeguards into "rights" that are related by the interest
protected, not by the usual circumstances of their invasion. Thus the
protections of personal security through the stages of the criminal or
administrative process, from arrest, bail, and fair trial, to habeas
corpus, double jeopardy, and legislative attainder, are collected under
the heading Sanctity of the Person (ch. 15). The next chapter, on
privacy, covers conventional searches and inspections as well as
electronic surveillance for both criminal and administrative purposes.
This discussion is followed by chapters on freedom of expression,
the equality principle, and religion. But the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination-including the problem of coerced
confessions-and the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishments are separated from the rest of criminal procedure and presented along with citizenship and nationality law in a final chapter
on Dignity of the Person. Here, too, we find the closely circumscribed
law of treason, far separated from the other constitutional doctrines
which have developed in response to the governmental pursuit of
"subversion" that gives us its modern functional equivalent.
The gain in focus and readability achieved by this organization
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carries a price. Professor Schwartz has introduced an unacknowledged
bias toward seeing the "rights" discussed as something apart from the
constitutional text that attempted, so far as the foresight and the
language of 1789 and 1866 would permit, to give them legal expression-a form of analysis one would consider a throwback to the
"higher law," but for the fact that Griswold2 commands caution in
dismissing the recurrence of "natural rights." This bias might have
been counterbalanced by inserting reminders, in discussions of the
case law, of the constitutional words before the judges for interpretation. But perhaps the implicit "natural rights" flavor is, if not deliberate, at least not uncongenial to the author's thinking. As a
matter of fact, this may be as good a place as any to mention-though
it seems unbelievable-that I could not find the text of the Constitution of the United States printed anywhere in these two volumes
of commentary on that Constitution.
On the substance of the issues, the author's positions defy the
Procrustean categories of "liberal," "conservative," "activist," "abstentionist," or whatever. He is emphatic on the importance of enforcing procedural guarantees against government agents of all kinds,
in the investigatory as well as in the trial process. A striking contribution, because the problem is so often ignored in the mainstream
of the alien and the immigrant, particularly with respect to entry
and deportation; these two emphases join, for instance, in a critique
of Abel v. United States. 3 On the other hand, Professor Schwartz is
satisfied to leave wiretapping policy to Congress; and his reasonable
apprehension of the irrational and destructive force of mobs, direct
action, and organized extremism (he refers more than once to the
experience of the Weimar Republic) allows him little sympathy for
the constitutional claims of those engaged in picketing and other
forms of demonstration, door-to-door canvassing, civil disobedience,
group libel, or communism.
The treatment of the first amendment, though painstaking,
largely recapitulates conventional wisdom. The author scornfully dismisses the debate on whether the free speech clause states an "absolute" by viewing, and refuting, the claim as one of an "absolute"
right of speech regardless of circumstances. This analysis is consistent
with his own approach, but it fails to examine the more plausible
claim that the amendment states an absolute prohibition against any
restraints directed in terms against speech. Yet we might have been
spared much if that approach had been developed in Gitlow 4 and
after; if it had confined the clear-and-present-danger test (or later
versions of it) to the restraint of speech under nonspeech laws, where
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
4. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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it originated, and had prevented the extension of that test to controls
expressly directed at speech rather than deferring to a supposed
governmental predetermination of the constitutional necessities.
Moreover, the author's first amendment analysis is obfuscated
by a curiously old-fashioned conception of "the police power," as
though this were some kind of affirmative grant of a defined authority
instead of a name for the residue of all plenary power that is not
constitutionally denied to state government. Thus he attempts to
explain why, though the first amendment protects only the verbal
element in speech, wearing "freedom buttons" is a privileged form
of protest but hanging rags on a clothesline is not: the police power
can reach the latter but not the former (pp. 396-97). These analytical
tools prove equally inadequate in the commentary on obscenity, in
Professor Schwartz's jurisprudence as in Justice Brennan's; the discussion begins with the "simple proposition" that the police power
includes the power to protect public morals, therefore it plainly
encompasses the power to protect the public against obscenity (p.
314). As this formulation indicates, the search for a "power" before
examining a claimed constitutional limitation prejudices the latter.
Of course the search is illusory; unlike the Federal Constitution,
state constitutions do not grant or delegate lists of powers any more
than do the national constitutions of unitary states or the British
constitution. But the method of analysis implies the possibility of a
"lack of power" antecedent to the first amendment claim-a theory
for which there can be no federal constitutional source save a reversion to generalized substantive due process. And the needless finding
of "power," which focuses on the case for control, will likely prejudge the real question of constitutional limitation, which focuses
on the case against control. 5
There is another drawback implicit in using the terminology of
"rights" of persons rather than that of constitutional limitations on
governmep.t: it obscures rather than highlights one of the most
interesting current phenomena in constitutional law. This is the
impending shift from ancient demands for limitations on a govern5. If the cited illustrations of the "freedom buttons" and the clothesline display,
for example, are to be distinguished by delimiting the reach of a "power" and not
only the reach of the first amendment's limitations, then a finding that the "power"
falls short would logically apply also to wearing similar buttons without a "freedom"
or any other message-that is, it would support a "right" that could not be founded
on the first amendment and, by the hypothesis of a prior search for "police power,''
need not be. These premises create trouble for the analysis of our most recent claims
of right in dress, hair styles, and the like (p. 396). They similarly confuse the deduction
of the constitutional status of obscenity from the power of the Court of King"s Bench
to punish Sir Charles Sedley for "making water on the persons below" from a balcony
in Covent Garden (p. 314). One would confidently assume that this would not give
rise to a first amendment claim even by today's more advanced theoreticians--despite
reports of some disputed emission from a hotel window during last summer's political
discussions in Chicago.
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ment of circumscribed functions to modem demands for affirmative
action from a pervasive government. As an eminent comparativist,
Professor Schwartz knows the different history, style, and role of
the power-limiting Bill of Rights and the concept of judicial review
in the Anglo-American tradition, as contrasted with the programmatic
social assertions which the Continental tradition enshrines in constitutions as the highest political symbols of past victories and present
commitments. vVhen constitutions of the latter tradition assert a
right to health, to welfare, to education, to employment, to a fair
share of the nation's material goods, they create a standard for the
political performance of government that is no more sought to be
enforced in courts than is the preamble of the Constitution of the
United States. In the present commentary, the author recognizes
that similar claims are being pursued at the frontiers of constitutional litigation under the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment; it would have added clarity if this development had been
displayed, and if the difficulty of deriving such political claims from
what are historically and textually restraints on government had
been discussed, uncluttered by the ambiguity of "rights."
But if much of the book's wisdom is conventional, it is so from
conviction and not from failure to recognize the troublesome questions. The conclusions are stated reasonably, without shouting or
preaching. The style matches the content. Much of it necessarily
is a parade of declarative sentences reciting holdings and citations,
enlivened by an occasional retelling of some significant case. The
author is an indefatigable collector of quotations from historic and
literary as well as legal sources, but these quotations are scattered
through the text as grace notes rather than for the relevance of the
source. The subject of constitutional rights is rife with temptation to
pontificate in orotund generalities and indisputable abstractions, and
sometimes those drawn from Supreme Court Justices and those of
the author tend to merge into one another. The chapter titles are
forced into an awkward parellelism of "rights"-Sanctity of the
Person, Privacy of the Person, Expression of the Person, Equality of
the Person, Belief of the Person, and Dignity of the Person-and
these capitalized titles are then used in the text as if they were established terms of constitutional law. The style also suffers from alternating the editorial "we" with abuse of the passive voice ("It is felt," "it
has been pointed out"), which sometimes leaves the source in doubt.
The most irritating quirk, however, is the author's undeviating misuse
of "such" for "this" or "the," paragraph after unrelenting paragraph,
until one is distracted from the substance to search for even one
"this." Such kind of editing ought to be one modest service a publisher extends to an author and his readers.
Despite its shortcomings, the completed work adds up to an im-
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pressive accomplishment. It is a detailed inventory of American constitutional rights as they exist two thirds of the way through the
twentieth century. The picture it presents is that of a mature legal
system, hedging the application of power to the individual by procedures evolved over centuries of English and American history and
by a few substantive axioms with which men of good will seek to
umpire the many collisions between the claims of government and of
individuals in a complex modem society.
Such an inventory largely submerges the original excitement of
clashing principles in a judicious review of working compromises.
But the reasonable judgments of judicious men-as lawmakers,
judges, or academic commentators-do not exhaust the function of
these principles. The protections against authority that law promises
the individual are always unfinished business. Their classic statement in the Constitution permits the perennial questions always to
be reopened: whether this Constitution does not pledge the society it
governs to be even more free, committed to tolerating even hostile
heresy and offense to good taste, committed to trusting in its survival
even without elaborate structures of secrecy and surveillance to
protect it. In the nature of things, such questions will long be pressed
only as minority views, in dissent on and off the Supreme Court.
They are not then "constitutional law." We knew, when we studied
the Constitution in the post-war years, that it did not forbid racial
segregation, or prosecutions based on illegally obtained evidence, or
the malapportionment of legislatures. Today there are other claims
that are not constitutional law. But even if some minority views
never become "constitutional law," it is nonetheless important that
those who assert them are appealing to the Constitution of the
United States-not against it.
Although Professor Schwartz stays close to prevailing doctrine
both in his presentation of "the law" and in his own preferences he
knows that his commentary necessarily speaks from its own time,
and he indicates where some of the known constitutional frontiers
in our time are. Whatever may lie beyond those, his work will have
lasting value in telling the future where the Rights of the Person
stood in the United States of 1968.
Hans A. Linde,
Professor of Law,
University of Oregon

